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Abstract Following the IUCN 5th World Congress on
Protected Areas in 2003, the then-President of Madagascar
decided to increase the area of Madagascar’s protected
areas from 1.7 to 6 million ha. To combine the aims of
protection and timber production, a new concept was
developed through the establishment of community-based
forest management (CBFM) sites, called KoloAla. How-
ever, experience shows that similar management transfers
to communities in Madagascar have only been successful
in a very few cases. We aimed to explore the success to be
expected of this new approach in the particular case of the
Manompana corridor at Madagascar’s eastern coast. In a
first step, the readiness of the corridor’s resource users for
CBFM has been analysed according to the seven resource
users’ attributes developed by Ostrom that predict an
effective self-organized resource management. In a second
step, we explored how KoloAla addresses known chal-
lenges of Madagascar’s CBFM. Analyses lead in a rather
sober conclusion. Although KoloAla attempts to address
the goals of poverty alleviation, biodiversity conservation
and timber production under a single umbrella, it does so in
a rather non-innovative way. Challenges with regard to the
state’s environmental governance, agricultural inefficiency
and thus deforestation remain unsolved.
Keywords Madagascar  Community-based forest
management  Resource management  Conservation 
Participation
Introduction
Many global conservation and development communities
focus on Madagascar’s forests, which are not only of high
importance for biodiversity but also of home to a highly
diverse range of precious woods. Timber and non-timber
forest products (NTFPs) contribute significantly to the
well-being of rural people (Ramamonjisoa 2004). While
the potential of some forest resources is not fully utilized,
the availability of forest resources is declining due to over-
exploitation and agricultural extension (Harper and others
2007). Moreover, a great number of rare woods are
exploited illegally (Ballet and Rahaga 2009; Randriamalala
and others 2011). For several decades both national and
international projects have tried to stop the destruction of
natural resources and to find ways to establish a more
sustainable forest management. In 1996, the decentralized
use of natural resources was legislated, providing the basis
for a new concept named KoloAla, which started in 2006.
KoloAla is a recently developed approach to protect forests
and people alike by means of sustainable, decentralized,
community-based forest management (CBFM). To date,
community-based forest management projects have rarely
been successful in Madagascar (Ballet and others 2007;
Froger and others 2004; Pollini 2010), often because
they do not offer sufficient financial incentives to local
peoples (Hockley and Andriamarovololona 2007) or they
are hindered by socio-cultural problems (Andriamalala and
Gardner 2010; Kull 2004). Based on these findings, the
question arises as to how the concept of KoloAla will
confront these challenges of community-based forest
management (CBFM), and how much it differs from the
already broad range of concepts and approaches that have
been tried before. The KoloAla concept has already been
implemented in the forest corridor of our study site, which
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includes the three municipalities of Manompana, Ambaho-
abe and Antenina on the east coast of Madagascar. The aim
of this article is to discuss whether the KoloAla concept is
the appropriate approach to meet both local inhabitants’
needs and national forest conservation interests under the
umbrella of one project. We therefore analysed current tra-
ditional forest uses, local governance systems, derivation of
income through forest products and the general importance
of the forest to local livelihoods in the forest corridor of
Manompana. In this article, we will discuss the following
questions:
1. Are the local inhabitants of the Manompana corridor
suitable candidates for a CBFM project?
2. Is KoloAla an appropriate approach for overcoming the
difficulties other CBFM projects have encountered?
To answer the first question, we use and discuss in Sect. 3
the seven attributes of resource users that predict a high
potential for success in CBFM, developed by Ostrom (1999,
2001). In contrast to the theory that multiple individuals,
acting independently, will exhaust a common limited
resource even if it is not in everybody’s interest for this to
happen (Hardin 1968), Ostrom has developed a list of seven
attributes for users that predict when collective action or self-
organized resource management of common-pool resources
by local communities will be effective. These attributes have
been elaborated based on a large body of literature and have
been discussed in a workshop held by CIFOR in 1997.
Although these attributes have been critically discussed,
researchers have found them important (Ostrom 1999).
A study conducted by Cox and others (2010) evaluated
Ostrom’s principles based on studies by other researchers.
They showed that Ostrom’s attributes are empirically well-
supported. More than 10 years after this workshop, they still
seem to be the most used and most interdisciplinary set of
generalized attributes for analysing self-organized resource
management (Fennell 2011; Schlager 2007). We therefore
decided to apply these attributes.
Forests in our study site are not entirely governed by the
local population; the framework of regulations is given by the
state and the authorization for logging activities is managed
by the state forest services. However, the state forest services
are not present to ensure any control. Although there exist
traditional forest ownership with regard to smaller forest
fragments in the study site, the access to all forest resources
(including timer and non-timber) remains open to all inhab-
itants (Urech and others 2011). We therefore consider these
forests as common-pool resources, as has been done in other
studies in Madagascar (Rabesahala Horning 2004).
To answer the second question, we additionally identified
how the implementation of CBFM in our study site fits into the
cultural context and the local social structures, and what could
be major constraints and challenges for the KoloAla approach.
Ostrom’s criteria are not optimal for analysing the charac-
teristics of the individual frameworks of CBFM system, as for
example KoloAla. Even if resource users demonstrate all
attributes to be successful in CBFM, they still need an ade-
quate framework of regulations and institutions that fit the
specific local livelihood systems. We therefore compared the
constraints and challenges we identified in Manompana with
other studies of CBFM success and failure in Madagascar, to
see how innovative and adequate KoloAla really is.
From Centralized Forest Management to KoloAla
In Madagascar, anthropogenic deforestation started when the
first human settlers arrived around 350 B.C. (Burney and
others 2004). There are many factors that contribute indirectly
to deforestation (Jarosz 1993; Shvidenko and others 2008) but
the main reason is the slashing and burning of forests on hill
sides and slopes to convert the land to rain-fed rice cultivation
(Agarwal and others 2005; Pfund 2000), a practice introduced
from southeast Asia (Dahl 1991), called tavy. It was in 1881
that prime minister Rainilaiarivony declared the forest
state property and banned slash-and-burn practice on forests
(Kull 2002; Ramamonjisoa 2004). Nevertheless, until the
French colonization, people continued to regard forests as
common resources and to apply their local rules and practices
(Rakotovao Andriankova and others 1997). During and after
colonization the administration tried to exclude the rural pop-
ulation from natural resource management and implemented
a general fire prohibition (Bertrand and Randrianaivo 2008).
However, due to an insufficient number of forest service employ-
ees, fires could not be controlled (Montagne and Bertrand 2006).
Gradual deforestation and a troubled relationship between the
local population and the state-run forest management did not
change even when Madagascar became independent in 1961
(Kull 2004). Natural forests remained state property.
In the mid-nineties, several studies confirmed that
Madagascar’s natural resource policies had failed (Kull
2004; Rabesahala Horning 2009; USAID 2009). For that
reason, a certain responsibility was relegated to the local
population through the implementation of a decentralized
resource management (Bertrand and others 1999a, b; Kull
2004). A result of this new insight was the introduction of
GELOSE (Gestion Locale Se´curise´e), a law that partially
devolves resource management responsibility of resource
management from the state to local institutions (Muttenzer
2006a, b). In parallel to GELOSE, the system of GCF
(gestion contractualise´e des foreˆts) was launched (Bertrand
and others 2006), enabling a local, decentralized and con-
tract-based forest management. The transfer of a beneficial
forest, particularly for timber management, to the local
population should result in people valuing natural forests
more (Bertrand and others 2009) and thus be an incentive
for forest conservation.
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Experience shows, however, that a successful transfer of
forest management has only been achieved in a very few
cases (ESSA 2008; Rabesahala Horning 2009; Raik and
Decker 2007; Razafy 2004). The politics of prohibitions by
the state resulted in widely illegal timber exploitation and
on-going deforestation (Bertrand and others 2009).
In 2002, Madagascar had a network of 1.7 million ha of
protected forests (Hufty and Muttenzer 2002). After the
2003 International World Congress on Protected Areas in
Durban, President Ravalomanana signed a declaration to
increase the area of 1.7 to 6 million ha (Rabesahala
Horning 2010). However, this new Durban Vision to
expand protected areas did not consider how to deal with
the increasing demand for woody forest products which can
only partially be met by plantations (currently around 22
million m3/year (USAID 2009). Thus, to ensure forest
protection and timber production at the same time, the
concept, ‘‘KoloAla’’, was established in close collaboration
with the international community (particularly the USA)
and the Ministry of Environment, Water and Forest
(MINENVEF). This new concept intends, with forest
zoning to simultaneously embrace sustainable timber pro-
duction, forest conservation and forest restoration in one
‘‘conservation site’’ (Bertrand and others 2009). In the year
2010, a total of 390,000 ha of forest was designated as
KoloAla sites, including the site in Manompana (USAID
2009). In fact, KoloAla is the label for a new generation of
community-based forest projects pushed largely by the
development community, including a package of approa-
ches building on GCF and in conjunction with previous
corridor approaches. However, all different KoloAla sites
are part of the broad national forest zoning program
(Ferguson 2010).
KoloAla Manompana
The KoloAla site situated in the Manompana corridor
contains 3 communes and 16 fokontany. A fokontany is an
administrative subdivision of several villages and hamlets.
The KoloAla project has transferred the right for forest
management to 16 COBAs (Communaute´ de base), one for
each fokontany. Each COBA has an unlimited number of
voluntary members, one management committee (UFA =
Unite´ d’ame´nagement villageois), an administrative person
and one president (KAM 2009). The COBA as an entity is
responsible for realizing the sustainable management of
forests, for distributing permits and for controlling and
penalizing forbidden actions by local farmers. Moreover,
the COBA is obliged to organize the investment of finan-
cial revenues in social projects or to distribute benefits.
Forest management and revenue-reinvestments are realized
on the level of fokontany. In total, the Manompana corridor
is composed of three types of zones (Fig. 1):
There is one core zone dedicated to strict nature con-
servation and forest restoration, which has been identified
through satellite images and biodiversity conservation cri-
teria. In every village, there are two more types of zones,
one for local consumption and one for commercial
exploitation, identified and delimitated together with local
inhabitants. KoloAla specialists and village representatives
working together determined the allocation of the forest to
the different fokontany.
As part of the formalized long-term contract between the
community associations and the state forest service, the
relevant aspects of the dina are discussed and adapted with
the community. The term dina refers to a traditional formal
pact that applies the customary law (Henkels 2001). As the
state has attempted to incorporate the dina rule-setting
institution of ‘‘traditional law’’ into modern law (Kull
2004), this is an important part of the KoloAla manage-
ment approach. For the elaboration of contracts, a local
team of Malagasy specialists facilitates the formation and
education of the COBA members, provides advice and
determines the forest zoning. We call these specialists the
KAM team (KoloAla Manompana team).
KoloAla Site
The KoloAla site in Manompana is located near the east
coast and comprises 50,000 ha with about 30,000 ha of
Fig. 1 The three different
zones in the KoloAla corridor
(Source: KoloAla Manompana
2009)
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forested landscapes (Rakotomavo 2009) (Fig. 1). It has an
average population density of 20 persons per km2 (Pfund
and others 2011) and belongs to the district of Soanierana-
Ivongo, in the region of Analanjirofo. Acting as an
important connecting zone between two other large forest
areas in the north and in the south, this area is called the
Manompana corridor. The implementation of KoloAla in
the corridor started in the year 2008.
Methodology
Interviews
Data collection based on interviews provides the analytical
basis to discuss (1) Ostrom’s seven attributes for resource
users and (2) possible constraints and the potential of the
system of KoloAla in Manompana (KAM). To analyse the
role and significance of the forests, particularly the role of
cash income generated by forest products, in local liveli-
hoods, we conducted household interviews (N = 110).
Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted in
each village with key informants (e.g. village authorities,
village elders, members of village associations, KAM
team, etc.) (N = 20) to explore local rules and governance
systems. For data collection, we chose four different vil-
lages according to their distance to the nearest edge of the
contiguous forest massif (distances of 0.2/0.5/2 and 3 h
walking time). Fieldwork was carried out during two field
periods, each of 6 months duration, in 2008/2009. All
involved researchers worked independently from the
KoloAla project team. However, it needed some months to
convince local farmers about the research project’s
independence.
Results have been discussed in two 3-day workshops in
2009 and 2010 with administrative authorities, the KAM
team, representatives from the state forest service, national
and international researchers and COBA members.
Influence of Wealth
Households were categorized into 3 wealth levels: poor,
intermediate and wealthy. Wealth criteria were based on
former research experiences (Adams and others 1997;
Carter 2008; Schmidt 2007) and then adapted to criteria
given by the local population. For each household, 0–24
points were allocated according to 14 different criteria.
These 14 criteria refer to legal and traditional ownership
(land, animals, houses, material, etc.), average cash
income, agricultural yields and diversity per season, health,
need for day labour, alternative income possibilities (other
than agriculture) and social position in the village.
Statistical Analysis
To examine if local people’s perceptions with regard to the
use of forest resources are influenced by (a) wealth level
and (b) distance to the forest massif, we applied statistical
analysis. All tests were conducted with Pearson’s v2 test.
Seven Attributes of Resource Users for an Effective
CBFM, According to Ostrom
Research has shown in many locations that forest users
have organized themselves to protect or manage forests in a
sustainable way (Adcharaporn and others 2006; Varughese
and Ostrom 2001). However, success depends on many
causal variables and processes (Agrawal and Chhatre
2006), the characteristics of the resource users themselves
being an important factor. Ostrom (1999) identified seven
attributes of resource users that predict a high potential
success for CBFM. In the following section, these seven
attributes will be discussed with regard to the resource
users of our study site.
Salience: Users are Dependent on the Resource
for a Major Proportion of Their Livelihood
Forests have diverse significances in local livelihood sys-
tems. In particular, forests act as land reserves and are thus
of high importance for the local population. 87 % of all
families (N = 101) say that they depend on forests. How-
ever, this importance often leads to deforestation. We
therefore focus on the importance of forest resources
themselves and not on the importance of the forest as a soil
reserve. In the study site, all the investigated families
(N = 110) harvest forest products for house construction
and 91 % harvest NTFPs for their personal consumption or
to generate cash income. The annual average cash income
per household from NTFPs and timber is between 3 and
12 % of what Rakotoarison (2009) analysed as the average
annual cash income per household from agriculture. This is
very low compared to other regions of Madagascar, where
researchers found that the villagers derive as much as 31 %
of their subsistence-based economy from forest products
(Shyamsundar and Kramer 1996). Moreover, 59 % of the
questioned families believe that they are able to survive
without natural forests, even though they use forest
resources almost every day. Although houses are built with
forest resources, people argue that alternative natural
materials from other landscapes could replace these
materials, even if they are of lower quality. Similarly, fuel
wood can be found in secondary vegetation or agroforestry
systems. Farmers see their dependency strongly related to
the substitutability of forest products through cultivated,
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bought or alternative natural products. Results suggest that
all people use forest resources but are not unconditionally
dependent on them. Dependency is a definition that
depends on individual judgement; thus, it is difficult to
predict whether people are truly dependent on forest
resources or not. According to those interviewed, the most
important role of forests is their function as soil reserves,
not the forest resources themselves.
Common Understanding: Users have a Shared Image
of the Resource and How Their Actions Affect Each
Other and the Resource
People from the four villages in our study site have rather
similar understandings in terms of rule interpretation,
acceptance of traditional authorities and use of forests.
Most families, poor or wealthy, immigrants or not, follow
the same rules of access or ownership and respect differing
taboos between lineages or families. A traditional under-
standing of forest ownership exists in the case of smaller
forest fragments but only refers to the right to forest
clearance and is well respected by villagers (Urech and
others 2011). In contrast to other regions (Samisoa 2001),
deforestation is not considered to be a problem caused by
migrants. But with regard to how ‘‘their actions affect each
other’’, images differ. To analyse differing images, we
asked three main questions.
For the first question (N = 78), we asked: ‘‘What are the
consequences of deforestation on your family’s well-
being?’’ 59% of all families see negative consequences.
The negative consequences cited are that families will need
more time to find necessary products (N = 16), income
through timber of NTFP will decrease (N = 13) and that
forest products will be of lower quality (N = 7).
However, 41 % of all families think that the disap-
pearance of the forest has no significant influence on their
livelihoods, or they think that their livelihood strategies
will change as the forest disappears but in ways that are
neither positive nor negative. We did not find a significant
difference in opinions among people of different wealth
levels (Pearson’s v2 = 2.106, df = 2, p = 0.334) or dis-
tance to forests (Pearson’s v2 = 2.314, df = 3, p = 0.510).
For the second question (N = 105), we asked whether
people ‘‘would agree with putting an end to slash-and-burn
of natural forests’’. Although we did not find a significant
difference between wealth levels, answers differed signif-
icantly between villages (Pearson’s v2 = 36.107, df = 3,
p [ 0.001). In the village closest to forest, only 4.2 % of
those questioned agreed, while 68 % of those interviewed in
the village farthest from the forest were in favour of ending
slash-and-burn of natural forests. However, almost all
farmers noted that it will be difficult to stop slash-and-burn
practices because of the need for more arable land for future
descendants.
After discussing the negative and positive consequences
of deforestation and the varying importance of forests for
livelihoods, we asked a third concluding question
(N = 94): ‘‘Could you survive without forests, without
experiencing fundamental problems?’’ The majority (59 %)
of families have the opinion that they would be able to
survive without natural forests; interestingly, this response
was not significantly related to wealth level (Pearson’s
v2 = 1.497, df = 2, p = 0.473). The difference between
villages is much more significant, ranging from 42 to 85 %
of respondents (Pearson’s v2 = 13.33, df = 3, p = 0.004).
Families in the village farthest from the forest massif had
the highest positive response rate, perhaps because they
have already experienced a high disappearance of forests
and have come to recognize that they can still survive.
However, even in the village closest to the forest massif,
79 % of all families share the opinion that they would be
able to survive without natural forest.
As in the previous section, results indicate that percep-
tions vary considerably between villages. We therefore
cannot assume a common understanding among users.
Discount Rate: Users have a Sufficiently Low Discount
Rate in Relation to the Future Benefits They Will Gain
from the Resource
Calculations of the discount rate and the future benefits
were simplified for the discussion of this publication. Exact
values for the benefits and discounts for families resulting
from timber trade cannot be calculated because legal tim-
ber trade has not yet been implemented. Due to a lack of
data, we could not explicitly analyse this attribute but
rather interpret it based on other material. We therefore
want to point out what future benefits forest resources may
supply under CBFM. We also show what general profit
losses farmers will have to accept if CBFM is applied.
In the case of Manompana, future benefits to be
achieved by CBFM will include alternative income gen-
erated by the timber trade, the improvement of social
institutions, such as schools and health centres, which will
be financed by revenue from the timber trade, the
improvement of environmental services such as water
supply and soil protection, as well as the sustainable pro-
duction of timber, fuel wood and NTFPs in the future.
The profit loss resulting from CBFM that people have to
accept results from the decreasing possibility for agricul-
tural expansion. To compensate, the rotation periods of the
remaining land will likely be shorter, which will result in a
loss of soil fertility and decreasing agricultural production
(Pfund 2000; Styger and others 2007). Moreover, farmers
will have to change a crucial part of their culture: farmers
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will no longer be able to expand their agriculture onto
forested land. The practice of cultivating ancestral lands to
connect future descendants with the ancestors is a deeply
rooted cultural desire, and as described by Keller (2009)
‘‘the most important aim in life’’.
Working at a similar study site, Shyamsundar and
Kramer (1996) estimated that families would be willing to
accept an end to current deforestation practices if they
received an annual compensation of 35 Euro per family.
According to analyses regarding the potential economic
value of precious woods in Manompana (Rakotomavo
2009), a gross revenue of 35 Euro per family could easily
be achieved in some villages through timber exploitation.
However, the distribution of revenue by the COBAs is not
yet organized and many families may not benefit directly
from cash income. We therefore argue that neither exact
benefits nor real benefit losses can be estimated in a way
that would be representative for all households and include
all benefits and losses that people accrue in reality.
Moreover, it is not the net amount of future benefits that is
crucial, but rather the evenness of the distribution of
benefits.
Distribution of Interest: Users With Higher Economic
and Political Assets are Similarly Affected by the Use
of the Forest as an Open-Access Resource
According to Tole (2010), communities with high levels of
wealth differentiation have very low levels of collective
management. The differentiation among the three wealth
levels in our study site is not high. Intermediate and
wealthier households depend on forest resources as much
as poor households for house construction, fuel wood or
cash income from forest products in times of food shortage
or crisis. Moreover, we could not find a significant differ-
ence between wealth levels in terms of NTFP collection or
trade of NTFP and timber.
We also analysed if forest owners and non-owners are
equally represented among the three wealth levels. Tradi-
tional forest ownership rules provide the right to convert
forest into agricultural land. Forest owners therefore have
soil reserves and the possibility for agricultural expansion,
as well as much greater interest in maintaining the tradi-
tional forest management rules than farmers without for-
ests. They will probably try to maintain their influence on
forest management, whether CBFM is implemented or not.
However, we could not find a significant difference with
regard to the relationship between forest ownership and
wealth. Forest owners are more or less equally represented
at all wealth levels. Also, we did not find a significant
difference between forest ownership and forest proximity.
Thus, the distribution of interest between people of
different wealth levels or forest proximity does not seem to
vary much.
Trust: Users Trust Each Other to Keep Promises
and Relate to One Another With Reciprocity
The primary source of trust in the traditional society in
Madagascar is the so-called fiahavanana (social cohesion)
which incorporates an idea of proximity, solidarity and
cohesion that creates ‘‘a fictive affinity between individu-
als’’ (Andriamalala and Gardner 2010). According to
Andriamalala and Gardner, the fiahavanana can go beyond
the circle of family and lineage to include other community
members who are not related by blood. This system implies
for its members the will to share values and to respect
common rules. All villages in our study site are organized
by traditional authorities, as is the case in other regions
(Cole 2001; Randrianatoandro Andrianavalona 2009).
With regard to forest management and conflict resolution,
we could observe that these authorities are well-accepted.
In traditional farming systems, farmers relate strongly to
one another to cultivate agricultural fields. Based on dis-
cussions and observation, we suggest that social cohesion
is also facilitated in our region by fiahavanana. However,
we cannot predict whether individuals trust each other or
not, but people definitely trust traditional authorities.
Autonomy: Users are Able to Determine Access
and Harvesting Rules Without External Authorities
Countermanding Them
The authority of users is only partially supported by actual
forest laws and forest management transfers. Under
GELOSE, the local population was legally given the
responsibility to govern their forests. However, the own-
ership of all natural forests is still in the hands of the state.
Moreover, CBFM projects in Madagascar follow previ-
ously devised concepts, strongly influenced by western
initiatives. The local population can only accept a concept
and influence some particular points; fundamental changes
are almost impossible to implement.
Of course, the main responsibility for management is
given to local communities under CBFM. However, even if
contracts are signed there is no guarantee that the local
population will maintain control of their community forest;
in other regions, transferred forests were rescinded because
of the state’s interest in mining (Bertrand and others 2008).
Among villagers mistrust against the state’s forest regime
is usual. This fact has also been noted for other regions on
the island (Ecole Supe´rieure des Sciences Agronomiques
2008). Muttenzer (2010) even refers to the forest service as
the ‘‘greatest source of insecurity’’.
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Prior Organizational Experience: Users have Learned
at Least Minimal Skills of Organization Through
Participation in Other Local Associations
Based on questionnaires, we discovered that prior to the
arrival of KoloAla in Manompana, no local association
apart from the sport association existed in three of the four
villages analysed. In only one of the villages, a group of
traditional forest owners developed a well-recognized
organization to protect the largest remaining forest frag-
ment in their village territory.
Nevertheless, villages are organized to resolve conflicts
among villagers, which requires a particular organizational
experience. Traditional bodies composed of village
authorities and village elders conduct conflict resolution.
These groups have a strong influence on the lives of local
people. Even though organizational experience is very low,
the existing knowledge and high influence capacity of
traditional bodies may offer considerable potential for
CBFM.
Discussion About Resource Users’ Attributes
Two of the seven attributes of resource users that predict an
effective resource management are clearly present in the
Manompana corridor. First, the distribution of interest
among resource users seems to be even. Most users have a
shared view of forests and all users are more or less sim-
ilarly affected by the use of forest resources. Second,
people trust village authorities and respect customary
rights.
Two attributes are neither really absent nor really ful-
filled. First, all users depend on forest resources in the
sense that they use forest products in their daily activities
and to gain some additional cash income. However, they do
not perceive themselves as dependent on these resources
and see the primary role of forests as soil reserves for
future agricultural conversion. Second, organizational
experience is very low; however, a certain traditional skill
by village authorities and village elders could have an
important potential.
The local population does not fulfil three attributes.
First, the understanding of how deforestation affects live-
lihoods differs significantly between villages, and is in
some cases influenced by the distance of the villages from
the forest massif. Second, with the current politics, laws
and existing approaches for forest management, users are
not able to determine access and harvesting rules without
external authorities countermanding them. Finally, it
remains unclear if future income through forest manage-
ment equally benefits the local population and if such
income will be higher than the discount rate.
Thus, one may conclude that the conditions in
Manompana are not suitable for a successful CBFM. On the
one hand, the characteristics of the population do not seem
adequate for such a transition; considerable support and
social capacity-building will be needed before community-
based management will work. On the other hand, the state
has a fundamental function with regard to supporting the
local population and to enhancing livelihoods, but it does not
yet seem willing or prepared to conform to its duties.
We also have to conclude that some of Ostrom’s attri-
butes could only be assessed with a certain ambiguity. The
assessment of the discount rate required clear numbers,
which are hard to obtain before CBFM is implemented.
And it is nearly impossible to integrate values that cannot
be expressed in numbers (e.g. cultural or spiritual values),
but which we consider absolutely necessary. Moreover, the
analysis of trust depends on personal interpretation. To
assess whether farmers trust each other or not is a highly
difficult task for outsiders, even for Malagasy researchers
living in other regions. We think that it might be unnec-
essary for all users to trust each other, but rather important
that users trust traditional authorities, which again depends
on personal interpretation. To finally conclude whether
resource users will successfully realize CBFM also
depends highly on the specific framework and regulations
of the CBFM system to be implemented at a particular site.
It is not only necessary that resource users fulfil Ostrom’s
attributes but also that the CBFM framework is adapted to
local livelihood systems and that resource users are sup-
ported by the responsible sate service. We would therefore
like to complement the analysis of Ostrom’s attributes with
an additional analysis of the KoloAla approach in the fol-
lowing section.
The Challenges of CBFM: Is KoloAla Innovative
Enough?
This section is based on a qualitative study. We compared
the approach of KoloAla in Manompana (KAM) with the
existing traditional management system. The main identi-
fied constraints and challenges are categorized into three
subsections: (1) meeting local realities with CBFM, (2)
forest zoning and COBAs and (3) control and monitoring
after the implementation of CBFM. All challenges are
discussed in relation to other studies and evaluations
regarding the success and failure of CBFM in Madagascar.
Meeting Local Realities with CBFM
Madagascar is well-known for its severe environmental
problems and has become a key site for global environ-
mental governance (Duffy 2006). In the absence of state
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capacity to devise, carry out and finance its own environ-
mental policies, foreign donors have been able to dictate
how conservation should be carried out (Rabesahala
Horning 2008). The majority of environmental activities
are initiated by external non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). As a result, most CBFM projects have been dis-
credited as external concepts applied to local realities
(Duffy 2006; Muttenzer 2010) without much regard for
local interests and concerns. As participation has become a
keyword for forest management since its introduction in
the nineties (Buttoud 2006), conservation interests have
attempted to harmonize with local interests by actively
involving farmers in the elaboration of management rules
and zones and by integrating their customary rights in legal
dinas (Kull 2004; Muttenzer 2006a, b). However, the
successful harmonization of conservation ideas and local
livelihood systems and interests is seldom achieved (Dirac
and others 2006; Keller 2008; Muttenzer 2010). It has been
shown all over the world that forest management systems
are more likely to have sustainable outcomes when local
forest users participate in forest rule-making (Persha and
others 2011).
Involvement of Local Inhabitants to Identify Local Rules,
Power Relations and Knowledge
In the case of KAM, the KAM team has involved the local
population since the beginning of the project. Through
discussions with villagers, the team first identified forest
borders of village territories and the areas preferred for
different management zones, as well as sites with specific
cultural significance. Researchers investigated the role and
availability of the most important NTFPs, as well as tra-
ditional governance structures and authorities to consider
them in COBA’s formalized contracts.
However, zones were discussed with maps and as most
of the farmers cannot read maps, they could not knowl-
edgeably enter the discussion about forest borders and
zones. This resulted in disagreements once the zones have
been designed. Furthermore, most village members do not
speak up in front of village elders or powerful families.
Even though discussions and elections of village repre-
sentatives organized by the KAM team had been conducted
with as many villagers as possible, decisions may not have
broad acceptance by village members. The structure of the
old social order (Henkels 2001), in which the oldest
member holds the last word and the population votes
according to his word, challenges the principles of partic-
ipation. This traditional social order enhances the risk of
reinforcing the power of an elite minority. A deep under-
standing of local power relations, hierarchies between
social categories of people, generations and gender are
necessary to identify local interests and to prevent future
conflicts. This, however, would hardly be possible in an
area of 100,000 ha with 16 fokontany and hundreds of little
villages that can only be reached by foot, each of which has
their own power relations and social structures. Such a task
could not be realized before implementing KoloAla.
Moreover, by studying the management plan of one
COBA (KAM 2009) developed by the KAM team, one
could argue about the extent to which local villagers
actively participated in rule-setting. For instance, one can
hardly imagine that women agreed to collect NTFPs only
in some designated areas, as they have traditional rules to
distribute Pandanus collection over the whole village ter-
ritory. Women know very well that collection must be
distributed so as to not endanger the plant’s regeneration
(Fedele and others 2011).
Although villagers could discuss and communicate their
interests, the local population did not make the final deci-
sions regarding rule setting. The zones for biodiversity
conservation, for example, where forest exploitation is
strictly forbidden, have been determined by satellite ima-
ges and not together with the local population. Hence, to
what extent can the implementation of a natural resource
management plan based on the concept of KoloAla really
be participatory? The principle framework of KoloAla was
devised before the integration of the local population into
participatory discussions. The question of whether partic-
ipation is not merely the manipulation of peoples’ views
and expectations to bring them into line with previously
devised plans, raised by Samyn (2006), seems quite rele-
vant in the case of KoloAla.
Meeting Local Interests with CBFM
Around 79 % of the families in the corridor live below the
poverty line (INSTAT 2007) and in extreme poverty
(Colfer and others 2011). Almost all the families are sub-
sistence farmers, depending on the cultivation of mountain
rice. In the whole corridor, agricultural production has only
been addressed by some NGOs, and then only close to the
road, not in the hilly hinterland of the corridor where
deforestation actually takes place (Rabenilalana and others
2010). Actually, timber trade occurs based on illegal
market systems and sometimes corrupt state control
(Randriamalala and others 2011). Following the imple-
mentation of KoloAla and a legal framework for forest
exploitation, the legal timber trade should increase cash
income considerably, making farmers less dependent on
agricultural production. But it remains debatable as to
whether it is realistic to focus solely on the forest for
combating poverty and ensuring resource conservation,
particularly when the majority of the population lives from
subsistence farming. Sodikoff (2009) described in the
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Biosphere Reserve Mananara Nord1 that persons now
living from income earned by conservation activities are
still dependent on family members planting rice on tavy
and deforested land. Although they gain money to buy rice,
they still buy it from farmers or family members in the
region. Thus, increasing income is a step in the direction of
poverty alleviation, but CBFM alone cannot simulta-
neously feed the growing population of Manompana
(CARE 2005) and decrease tavy on cleared areas.
Adapted practices for yield improvements or for
avoiding soil erosion are not known in Manompana. No
single farmer is working with intensified rice systems or
other improved techniques, such as the direct planting on
permanent soil cover (Husson and others 2003) promoted
by CIRAD2. So how can farmers stop their well-known
practices of tavy if they do not know any alternative?
Uphoff and Langholz (1998) have demonstrated at
Ranomafana that CBFM can be enhanced by strong yield
improvements on irrigated rice fields. In Ranomafana, they
searched for more attractive agricultural systems which
could replace the traditional tavy. Although increasing
yields on irrigated rice fields alone is no guarantee that tavy
will decrease, it offers a great potential for combating
poverty and lean seasons.
Nevertheless, agricultural expansion and deforestation is
due to not only agricultural production but also ancestral
customs, as also described in the Masoala region by Keller
(2008). Forests are primarily a resource to ensure subsistence
and the continuity of the lineage. The interest in conserving
forests only rises when forest resources become scarce and
cannot fulfil the needs of the families. Another important
point for KAM to consider is that villages with already scarce
forest resources might be much more interested in CBFM
than villages with large remaining forests. It could therefore
be an advantage that KAM includes the whole corridor, even
villages with little remaining forest.
However, the interest of people in preserving forests can
only be raised when measures have a positive impact on
their well-being (Adams and others 2004). Thus, CBFM
should meet the interests of the local population. With its
high economic potential, the timber trade could actually lie
at the centre of peoples’ interest. But the necessary
framework for sustainable management is far from their
local realities. The key interest of farmers, cited by almost
100% of those interviewed, is in increasing agricultural
yield, not conserving forests. Environmental politics in
general and CBFM in particular should thus be placed in a
larger framework of strategies that includes the whole
complexity of poverty reduction and sees forests as one
part of a larger, interactive landscape.
Forest Zoning and COBAS
By formalizing dinas as legal rights into contracts, the
responsibility of the local population for resource man-
agement is confirmed (Bertrand and others 1999a, b).
Despite this legal affirmation, the principal rules and reg-
ulations are imposed by the state under KoloAla, as in
former approaches for management transfers (Serpantie´
and others 2008). In many cases, important customary or
ancestral rights are ignored by external NGOs while others
are adapted to legal state rules, which lead to a deceptive
understanding of CBFM by the local population and thus to
conflicts (Andriamalala and Gardner 2010; Kull 2004).
Traditional tenure rights are still mostly ignored by CBFM
approaches (Muttenzer 2006a, b). We will discuss two
specific issues with regard to tenure rights that could be
problematic in the case of Manompana.
The Zoning of Forests by Fokontany
Forest borders have been identified and classified into three
different zones with the participation of the local popula-
tion. These forest zones refer to the fokontany territory.
However, traditional forest management does not refer to
village or fokontany territories, but to the resource alloca-
tion of different lineages (Keller 2008; Muttenzer 2006a, b).
Forests of a lineage can go beyond the territory of a
fokontany and are not limited to the administrative terri-
tories. Fokontany is an administrative subdivision intro-
duced by the state for better administrative control and is
far from traditional custom (Cole 2001). Villages have no
clear borders; they can change depending on the situation,
interests and purpose, a fact also described in the literature
for other regions (Kull 2002; Leach and others 1999). This
unity does not refer to a homogenous interest group with
clear boundaries and natural resource allocation. Andri-
amalala and Gardner (2010) noted that if natural resources
are managed by several social groups, complications and
conflicts arise. We suggest that this will be the case in
Manompana as long as forests are managed by COBAs that
are not related to lineages. What is needed in Manompana
is a structure of governance able to resolve conflicts
between social groups and different stakeholders, an
institution able to affect continuous negotiation, commu-
nication and conflict management (Colfer 2005). The
potential and knowledge of traditional village institutions
to resolve conflicts between villagers has been identified
and must absolutely be integrated into COBA’s structures.
Additional skills for continuous conflict management
should be developed in all COBAs during the initial phase.
1 Mananara Nord is a commune situated on the east coast of
Madagascar, north of Manompana.
2 Centre de coope´ration Internationale en Recherche Agronomique
pour le De´veloppement.
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Forest Owners—Members of COBAs
Customary rights with regard to forest management define
the conditions of open access to forest resources for the
whole corridor. These include the right to convert forests for
agricultural expansion and the distribution of forested land to
immigrants. Traditional forest owners and traditional village
authorities are both well-accepted by the local population, as
is the case in other regions of Madagascar (Aubert 2008). If
these authorities and traditional owners are ignored by
KoloAla, forest management may, according to Muttenzer
(2006a, b), continue with two parallel legal systems: one
based on the introduced KoloAla rules and one based on the
traditional customary rights. This leads to confusion and the
continuation of tavy on natural forests.
Traditional forest owners and village authorities should
be represented in COBAs. The KAM team tried to achieve
the integration of traditional authorities by asking the local
population who should represent the village for discussions
and problem resolution. However, interviews showed that
lineages that are the accepted owners of large areas and
therefore have much influence on traditional forest man-
agement were not taken into consideration. This is not
surprising, as the KoloAla concept of CBFM attempts to
avoid privileging forest owners or powerful lineages. These
lineages cannot be ignored, however, as they constitute the
daily reality of the local population and have considerable
power. Some lineages or forest owner may therefore con-
tinue to abide by customary rights rather than by the legal
rules of KAM.
Control and Monitoring After the Implementation
of CBFM
The implementation of CBFM is in itself a difficult chal-
lenge. A related, equally important concern is the contin-
ued monitoring and control of CBFM, which should be
undertaken by the communities themselves, thereby guar-
anteeing sustainable management.
Support and Mentoring of COBAs
Until now, CBFM in Madagascar has always been imple-
mented with the support of external institutions and NGOs.
Once the COBAs were established, the management zones
identified and contracts signed, local communities had to
continue on their own (Rambeloarisoa and Razafy 2008).
Long-term support, instruction and mentoring by external
institutions failed in most cases (McConnell and Sweeney
2005; Muttenzer 2010). In general, support is available for
a maximum of 3 years, a period certainly not long enough
for communities to develop the social capacity to run and
monitor CBFM independently (Bertrand and others 2008).
At the time of this writing, the support and instruction of
KAM have been in place since 2007. Team members have
been present and have repeatedly visited even the most
remote villages of the corridor. Inventories, market analy-
sis (Sola 2010), long-term management plans and annual
harvesting plans have been designed by the KAM team in
collaboration with the local population. This is a valuable
and rather unique support for COBAs. Nevertheless, the
population is still strongly influenced by mistrust against
the state and external forest organizations (ESSA 2008). To
regain the trust of the local population, stable and long-
lasting backing by the government as well as governmental
faith in the local population is needed. However, this issue
can only be addressed in part by KAM, as it is strongly a
factor of national politics.
The Role of the State
Environmental initiatives in Madagascar are often based on
project frameworks financed by donors and do not follow a
homogeneous national government strategy (Ramamonj-
isoa 2004). As a result, such initiatives do not reflect a state
impulse or major interest. This is clear when considering
the fact that for the whole region of Analanjirofo (1.2
million ha of forests), the state forest service has one
person who is responsible for the control and monitoring of
all forests. Due to the non-existent personnel capacity,
control and announcement of illegal activities must be
conducted by the local population itself, by the COBA.
However, for local farmers it is a nearly impossible task to
exclude outsiders, and to punish or accuse farmers from the
same region (Sodikoff 2009). The exclusion of outsiders
remains a problem, also for KAM. Loggers, for example,
are typically from outside of the fokontany territory. Fol-
lowing customary rights of open access, this is allowed.
This open access will have to be limited and controlled by
local farmers under CBFM. However, the local population
is confronted with the challenge of how to exclude or
punish persons who are not officially permitted to log but
who are members of the same lineage or even family.
Individuals depend on the ancestral systems of fiahavanana
(Andrianananja and others 2006). As each individual
depends on this network, it is often impossible to betray
someone of the same ‘‘family’’ (Andriamalala and Gardner
2010; Sodikoff 2009). Similarly, it is difficult to exclude
neighbouring populations from access to the many
resources of forests (McConnell and Sweeney 2005).
Although this problem is well recognized, it is ignored by
the state.
Without strong state support that assists with the con-
tinuous control of forest management, CBFM will not
succeed (Rambeloarisoa and Razafy 2008). KoloAla is
integrated in a national concept with a homogeneous
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strategy for several sites in Madagascar. KoloAla has the
potential to help the state evolve a national concept of
support and monitoring for local communities. Neverthe-
less, the state must take initiative itself, and global donors
should support Malagasy’s initiatives rather than pushing
their own ideas.
Conclusion
Ostrom described seven attributes of resource users that
should be fulfilled to predict successful community
resource management. Our results showed that with regard
to the rural dwellers of the Manompana corridor, only two
of these attributes are fulfilled completely, and another two
only partially. Three attributes are not fulfilled at all.
Hence, we suggest that the question posed in the intro-
duction ‘‘are local inhabitants of the Manompana corridor
suitable candidates for a CBFM project?’’ can be answered
with ‘‘no’’.
This should not be interpreted as a definite conclusion,
however, as some of these attributes are difficult to mea-
sure (e.g., users’ dependency on the resource or the dis-
count rate). Moreover, some of the attributes could and
should be enhanced by improving the capacity of the state
forest services to support local villagers. Organizational
experience can be learned, and to cope with the fact that
people do not have a shared understanding of the impor-
tance of the forest, different interest groups should be
involved in the decision-making process. We conclude that
the resource users’ attributes are an important indication
for the success of CBFM, but are heavily dependent on the
CBFM approach and the support they receive from external
organizations or the state.
The discussion about CBFM’s challenges in Madagascar
shows that KoloAla in Manompana, as many former
CBFM projects, is confronted with well-known constraints.
Moreover, people in the study site live in highly remote
areas where the poverty rate is extreme and agricultural
production remains at the lowest level in the country. Due
to the difficult circumstances of the local population,
challenges to realize CBFM might even be greater in
Manompana than elsewhere, and combating poverty with
only CBFM may be a difficult or almost impossible task.
KoloAla is another approach toward establishing decen-
tralized resource management. However, like earlier
approaches, KoloAla has to tackle the deeply rooted culture
of tavy, the high poverty rate and differences between
western ideals and local understanding. These realities of
rural areas in Madagascar have not changed and despite
many negative conclusions about former CBFM projects,
there is no fundamental evolution in the concept of
KoloAla.
Moreover, the lack of motivation and field personnel in
the state forest service, both of which have significantly
limited the success of earlier projects, will represent major
challenges for KoloAla again. And the current political
instability does not contribute to a more legal and trans-
parent timber exploitation supported by a strong state forest
service. Madagascar surrenders issues of natural resource
conservation to the international community and seems
either unwilling or unable to resolve problems on its own.
The same is true for the agricultural sector, which is tightly
linked to deforestation. Agricultural production remains
low, technical support is non-existent, particularly in
remote areas, and the problem of poor market access
remains unresolved. Unfortunately, while the state ignores
the association between agriculture and forestry, the con-
cept of KoloAla seems to separate these two sectors once
again. The most important issue for the local population in
the Manompana corridor remains agricultural production,
which is far from being enough to feed even just the pro-
ducers themselves. Until this fundamental problem has
been at least partly resolved, people are neither willing nor
able to be interested in CBFM.
To answer the second question posed in the introduction,
‘‘is KoloAla an appropriate approach for overcoming the
difficulties other CBFM projects have encountered?’’ we
suggest that KoloAla alone is not innovative enough to
overcome existing challenges without a stronger collabo-
ration with the state. Without the full acceptance of cus-
tomary land tenure rights and the merited responsibility for
rural dwellers, combined with a strong desire by the state to
change the context of rural realities, KoloAla may
encounter the same problems and failures as many earlier
projects.
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